Insurgent snipers in southern Afghanistan

Somebody is keeping the pot boiling at the right temperature with sniper-like precision, adding assets to the deadly mix of the Afghan insurgency. That is what I tend to ponder when I consider this piece of text here:

"On Aug. 13, the day the company arrived in Sangin, a Marine stepped from his armored vehicle about 100 yards from a secure U.S.-British patrol base. The sniper fired a single shot, killing the soldier, the Journal said.

On the same day, Darren Foster, 20, a British army engineer from Carlisle, England, was shot and killed as he walked in an unprotected small space that bridge two areas of bulletproof glass, the Journal reported.

"(The sniper) hit a moving target in a space this big," said Capt. Jim Nolan, Lima Company's commander, indicating a space of 9 inches with his hands."

I am thinking of "somebody's" role with the alternative in mind - that is:

- The Taliban suddenly managed to buy some good sniper rifles on the market, and could finally put to use the sniper skills of some of their best available marksmen.

- They took/take the time to have some of their own trained as snipers by pros.

Alternative nr. 1 is unlikely, while alternative nr. 2 is in the end not that different from the original proposition.

Opium roads

"In the green zone, everything is irrigated, and everywhere there's a field. That's a problem, because the Taliban, instead of wanting to fight with us, they plant mines, so we have to drive in the fields. Now, what the talking was about - it was about - we've been driving on the fields, we try to drive on poppy, but sometimes we also have to drive on their wheat. If we can establish that the claim is valid, we have a CIMIC team who can pay compensation for it."

Quote from Jon, a Danish army interpreter, who speaks about half a dozen languages. In: "Complex Working Environment" - video available at the NATO Channel TV. Direct URL cannot be provided, as the website does not work that way; you will see.

The Ministry is not able to say that much, for now, about what Jon's company could do about this. Force protection is important to them, especially to their political leaders back home, and they won't give up on armour when they enter the "green zone" (which ironically means the opposite of what it used to mean in Iraq, in terms of security).

The interesting thing to note is the contrast. When the look of this website was changed a while ago, at the time when the Ministry took over running this place, an incident was mentioned here where U.S. Marines paid compensation to an opium poppy farmer for having a C-17 airdrop land on his field, crushing some plants. Back in December last year, another incident was covered at this site, whereby a U.S.-led police team, there with an escort of Canadian soldiers, thought it the best approach to winning the hearts and minds of an outlying village in Kandahar province, to destroy all the marijuana plants that were found there. We have written of Polish soldiers participating in destroying opium poppies hashish plants in Ghazni, and of Dutch forces only reluctantly helping an Afghan Eradication Force/Dyncorp team once they got into trouble back in 2007 (originally covered by Mr. Anderson for the New Yorker). I know of countries that would not care a bit if somebody would grow poppies beside their main base, mainly not to get into trouble because of that, and now I learned that for the Danes, theoretically, it is cheaper to drive on poppies than it is on wheat (provided they are really not ready to pay compensation on occasions when they drove on somebody's poppies, if that is really what Jon may be implying).

Trying to deal with a rural insurgency, why would it be important to have a coherent approach to these issues... like, what to do about farmers' crops and all that...

Pat Porter, discussing the proposition that more Pashto speakers would be needed by Western armies in Afghanistan, ironically asks: "How do you say ‘we are destroying your opium crop’ in Pashto?" Jon, quoted above, knows that, and Pat Porter is right, it probably doesn't help all that much. Otherwise, the Ministry's position is still rather that it would be mighty good to have a thousand Jons out there.

Expression of thanks

"Wandering Afghan goatherd holds up lethal attack on Taleban roadside bombers"

The Ministry hereby issues the following press statement:

Thank you for not bombing the goatherd who was so irresponsible as to walk his goats out there in the Afghan middle of nothing!

Thank you for not bombing the bridge in a country we would like to see "reconstructed," and where giving farmers the chance to use a decent road infrastructure - among other things - is the only hope for the long run to rid the country of opium poppy cultivation.

And now for the more serious part. Maybe the Ministry should set up a new working group to examine how four people involved in doing something bad in the middle of the field can be stopped in any other way than using F-16s and a hundred armed men.

And look! This Ministry is working fast! Here are the conclusions! Already!

The answer is so damn simple. Collect intelligence. Follow where the guys are going, get to know at least which village they are headed to. Mark the location of the IED. Get rid of the IED later on. Go to the village where these guys came from. Oops... you cannot go there just like that, as there are hundreds of AK-wielding Taliban in there? Maybe that is a bigger problem! Or, alternatively, if you can go there, maybe you should ask some questions. Maybe you should wonder what the village could be offered to get them to do what you want. Protection? Participation in that project in the vicinity that they were excluded from?

The alternative of using A-10s (the Ministry expresses uncertainty whether these were A-10s) to spray bullets at IED planters is a second-best option. At least it is not so damn reckless. But of course then you do not get the nice part of knowing who on earth live around you on that unknown planet you and your comrades were deployed on, which you might do if you ask questions from people who may know some answers.

In other words, do not be so enemy-centric.

Asymmetric war reporting

Remember that piece from Nancy A. Youssef, describing how different Marines are finding the experience of fighting in Afghanistan from what they faced in Iraq?

"In Iraq, a half-hour firefight was considered a long engagement; here, Marines have fought battles that have lasted as long as eight hours against an enemy whose attacking forces have grown from platoon-size to company-size."

But NATO's so-called master narrative still says, about 2008:

"The significant increase in security incidents this year is due to an increased use of asymmetric tactics by insurgents."

And this is similar to what Theo Farrell said in a House of Commons hearing about Afghanistan.

"There are combat operations, which I would call formation warfare, where the Taliban or other groups gather in company-size formation-between 50 and 200 soldiers-and launch a formation attack against one of our patrol bases, or even against a forward operation base. On the other hand there are terrorist attacks, which would comprise suicide bombs, improvised explosive devices and sniper fire. The important point to realise is that this past year, as I understand it, we have seen a significant reduction in formation warfare by the Taliban, and an increase in terrorist attacks. Some observers have said that that is very worrying, because they are moving to asymmetric tactics, which presents a great challenge for us.

I see it as a positive development. The simple reason why they have moved to asymmetric tactics is that between 2007 and early 2008 we caused considerable attrition to their force structure. It is very hard to get reliable figures, but I understand from speaking to people in the Ministry of Defence that they think that around 6,000 Taliban have been killed. So we have gutted a lot of their lower command structure, which has forced them to move towards more asymmetric tactics."

There may seem to be a contradiction between what the Marines say, and what, among others, the Brits say. Both were making first-hand observations in Helmand, which makes this all the more interesting.

Now here are some statistics. First, from Anthony Cordesman's comprehensive presentaion on the Afghanistan/Pakistan war, prepared for CSIS, page 22, showing growth in the number of direct fire attacks. Watch the blue columns.
Then from ANSO's Q1 report (thanks to Christian for drawing attention to it), page 8, showing growth in the number of "close range" attacks.

And some more statistics from ANSO, page 10, about tactics, showing the proportion of small arms/RPG attacks which grew from 54% in Q1 of 2007 to where it is now, in the first quarter of 2009.
This could be interesting to address. ANSO's team concludes that insurgents have stable logistical support, a steady supply of recruits and they are capable of engaging the other side's forces in a conventional manner. At least as long as the first jet-delivered bomb does not drop by for some truly asymmetric action, I would add.

In other news, things are looking bad. In more ways than one.

Analogies: Nepal and India's northeast

In the morning, one of my students gave a presentation on the Nepalese coup d'état of 2005, and he highlighted this excerpt from ICG's report about the events. "A retired Indian general with longstanding Nepal connections" is quoted on page 8 as having said:

"I'm still shocked by the incompetence of the RNA (Royal Nepalese Army) and by its dangerous tactics. For example, in this day and age we would never use helicopter gunships in counter-insurgency work -- helicopters for transport, sure, but this is a war that can only be fought on the ground level. Firing into jungles from a thousand feet up has no real military benefit and is bound to be counter-productive when innocent civilians end up as victims."

Sure, this holds some relevance for the campaign in Afghanistan as well. Not that helicopters are firing into a jungle there, like that, but as everyone knows, there is a tendency to use a lot of CAS (close air support).

Meanwhile, it was very timely for me to have that thing come up now for other reasons, too. I'll be interested to hear just this afternoon a lecture by Gulshan Sachdeva on a "Development strategy for the Indian Northeast." Will of course get back to you to say a few comments perhaps, at the end of the day.

One more quote from the ICG report, same page, this time from another Indian academic, telling you nothing new, just showing how much of a coincidence it is that I ended up hearing a presentation based partly on this report today:

"S.D. Muni, the former ambassador widely recognised as India's leading academic authority on Nepal. "India's own experience in the northeast and in areas affected by Naxalite Maoist guerrillas is that military methods may, at best, help, but cannot deliver a solution to internal revolts and insurgencies." "

The promised update: Prof. Sachdeva gave a very interesting presentation. I wouldn't want to outline his ideas as though he would have given his lecture to the readership of this blog. But I will point out at least one thing.

Over at the Frontline Club, Alex van Linschoten lists a couple of issues he would like to see the media cover this year - stories that could be especially interesting in his view. All are interesting, indeed. The very first is: "NGOs who indirectly (or directly) fund the Taliban." Now, this is something also of interest when it comes to India's Northwest. Not really because of NGOs. There, in many places, it's state-run projects where contractors end up passing on state development money to guerrillas, to buy operational security, generating a vicious cirlce that perpetuates the insurgency.

En opération avec les paras

"En opération avec les paras," i.e. on operations with the French paratroopers of the 8e RPIMa, one gets very similar experiences to what others are finding out about on the ground in Afghanistan elsewhere. The Janvier 2009 issue of RAIDS includes a lengthy article on operations in Kapisa province, and many familiar themes come up.

I find something especially noteworthy after the French government decided not to offer any increased contribution at the Munich Security Conference, for now - this position could theoretically change still, by the time of the April NATO Summit, of course. Anyway, here's what the French paras found in the village of Jagdaley; in my raw translation of an excerpt from the article, leaving out some of what's in it (p.41.):

"The population "demands a lot" from the French. A generator, because there's not one running, but also the provision of medication to the clinic (financed by the Americans), the supplying of firewood, and of clothes for the children, because the winter tends to be harsh in this remote valley. French CIMIC units can't come here regularly. All CIMICs require escort, and for the zone of BATFRA, there are but two CIMIC teams, with a limited budget. 22,000 Afghans live in the valley.

'The leader of the village asked me if we would come back. And when we would,' recounts Frédéric, conscious of the stakes, which he will include in his report to 'Panther.' Inhabitants of the valley have already been deceived by earlier visits by Western teams, and noone can tell if the next time, when their hopes turn out to have been in vain, their disappointment doesn't push them into indifference, or worse, into the rebellion's ranks.

Up to this point, the 500 families of Jagdaley held out, and they have even come to the aid of the ANA (...) when they were attacked by insurgents, in September (2008 - P.M.). But come the winter, the terror of the insurgents, the need to survive, and one mistaken shot by the coalition may change everything, unbalance everything."

Yes - the old rule of clear, hold, build applies. For which one should always have the necessary resources, too, in an ideal world.

The ambush against the French

J.L. Krueger, to whose blog I was alerted by Ghosts of Alexander, has recently, not long after the August 18 incident, posted on the ambush in which 10 French paratroopers were killed (in the Uzbeen valley, in Kapisa province). Krueger makes the point that for the guerrillas to achieve the tactical surprise they did was clearly a case of mistakes made by the French. He cites rumours that some of the French were not carrying weapons, and that some didn't have their helmets or even their bulletproof vests on. And he says that the guerrillas monitor patrols and that is how they knew the French were vulnerable.

From my reading of the French press, the picture is a lot worse than even that.

1. A French soldier who was there on a patrol in the Uzbeen valley after the August 18 ambush, recalls this in le nouvel Observateur (the August 28/September 3 issue; not my only source for all I'm writing of below):

"Ils avaient mis des guetteurs partout. Je n'ai pas compris à ce moment-là."

The omnipresence of spotters in the insurgency-struck areas is something I myself knew of. Here in my armschair. By the way I've even written about it, back in 2007. That's a bad score on sharing vital information for all the coalition.

2. The interpreter who would have gone with the French troops on the patrol to the Uzbeen valley on August 18, just vanished, two hours before departure. The patrol went forward anyway.* (correction below)

3. There was no specific aerial reconnaissance done on the area before the patrol went out. Not even after the interpreter was gone.

4. The disappearance of the interpreter is just a symptom of a bigger problem. The guerrillas knew days in advance of the patrol. They stashed a lot of ammo at the ambush site.

5. Some French officers now openly talk of how badly provisioned the French fighting force is, in general, in Afghanistan. Not enough ammunition provided to soldiers, green-coloured vehicles that don't give good camouflage, AMX-10s the only suitably armoured asset which, however, can't cross the narrow streets of villages, UAVs not available etc.

6. The French paratroopers went into the Afghanistan mission thinking they are much better than the Americans. They were thinking things like this: we are going to be closer to the population than others - we are traditionally much better at this; the Americans, they never leave the cover of armour, unlike we; we are going for the hearts and minds - unlike the Americans who just want to fight enemies. And so on. My simple message: whoever taught these soldiers that, now, in 2008, is an idiot. This is not a beauty contest - even if you wish to make it one, the conditions on the ground won't allow you to do that. Besides, hearts and minds is something of which I'm tired of hearing journalists say it's what their country does, contrary to the others in the coalition. Do the homework and use common sense.

Tellingly, the reporter of the already cited le nouvel Observateur, Florence Aubenas, is happy to recite jokes such as this: what's the difference between American and Soviet soldiers? The salary.

Ironically, the paratroopers were also proud, at the same time, of having the chance to do some fighting, which they have missed in some of the latter wars France took part in, and for which they were jealous of other units in the armed forces.

7. Back to the ambush itself. Mortars were not set up to provide optimal support to the dismounted patrol that ran into the ambush uphill from where they left their vehicles behind.

8. CAS from U.S. aircraft couldn't come for a long time because the combatants were too close to each other for comfortably pounding the mountain.

9. There's something at the end of the Observateur's article, which I still need to mention. The excerpt of the original in French included here. Get a dictionary if you have trouble understanding the gist of it, though it's not that difficult. The necessary background is that there was a small village near where the patrol's vehicles were parked, and away from the ambush site uphill. Here's an excerpt first from a map on page 41 of le nouvel Observateur:

"En représailles le dernier hameau traversé par la colonne est détruit, selon des témoignages militaires, par 4 missiles Milan tirés par les paras français. Deux autres hameaux sont détruits lors d'un raid aérien le lendemain."

On page 44 this is repeated as part of the article itself:

"Quatre missiles Milan ont été tirés contre le village, deux autres hameaux ont été détruits dans un raid aérien le lendemain. L'agence Pajhwok estime qu'il y aurait plusieurs dizaines de civils morts. "Je ne suis pas certain qu'ils étaient directement impliqués dans l'attaque contre les français," dit le colonel Rumi Nelson-Green, porte-parole de la coalition. "Ça na aucune importance. Ils étaient certainement au moins complices." "

This has to be checked. It just strikes me as odd that someone speaking for the coalition would say something like that, at a time when the collateral damage of airstrikes elsewhere causes such embarrassment. I specifically wonder if the question to which Nelson-Green said this was about the Pajhwok report of casualties. I also find it weird that Aubenas, a reporter who had earlier quoted a joke likening U.S. soldiers to Soviet soldiers, in an approving context, should have no particularly critical comments when citing this. Communicating things like that in this way just fits Aubenas' doomy-gloomy article too well, in a cursory way, but makes it incoherent at a deeper level. So, this is what I'll do. I don't believe this unless somebody sends me the press briefing's transcript, where this was said, or if this is verified from another source.

For those who wonder if doing the thing that was described in the quote above is not right from a humanitarian point of view, but right from a counterinsurgency point of view (mind you, I don't know if this did happen indeed), I have this article to link to (for some substantial reading), and I'll just say you'd be wrong to think that way. This sort of thing is bad in all sorts of ways. And, just to put this into perspective: It's not the coalition's habit to handle potentially similar incidents in a casual way. When Polish soldiers did something similar, they were later arrested and now they are facing trial at a military court in Poznań.

* My mistake above: two interpreters have gone missing, not one. And it happened several hours before departure.