MoStFab: August 2010

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

Insurgent snipers in southern Afghanistan

Somebody is keeping the pot boiling at the right temperature with sniper-like precision, adding assets to the deadly mix of the Afghan insurgency. That is what I tend to ponder when I consider this piece of text here:

"On Aug. 13, the day the company arrived in Sangin, a Marine stepped from his armored vehicle about 100 yards from a secure U.S.-British patrol base. The sniper fired a single shot, killing the soldier, the Journal said.
On the same day, Darren Foster, 20, a British army engineer from Carlisle, England, was shot and killed as he walked in an unprotected small space that bridge two areas of bulletproof glass, the Journal reported.
"(The sniper) hit a moving target in a space this big," said Capt. Jim Nolan, Lima Company's commander, indicating a space of 9 inches with his hands."

I am thinking of "somebody's" role with the alternative in mind - that is:

- The Taliban suddenly managed to buy some good sniper rifles on the market, and could finally put to use the sniper skills of some of their best available marksmen.

- They took/take the time to have some of their own trained as snipers by pros.

Alternative nr. 1 is unlikely, while alternative nr. 2 is in the end not that different from the original proposition.

WaPo v. geography

WaPo heralded major U.S. base expansions upcoming in Afghanistan yesterday. Its syndicated content reappeared elsewhere as well. Among the expansions discussed is an interesting one, in Shindand. Even more interestingly, the article says it is "north of Kabul." But in fact it isn't. In fact, more significant is its proximity to Iran, potentially. It is not really the sort of place where you would need a lot more SFs to... halt the insurgency in Afghanistan (which is not to say there is no insurgency in Shindand and its environs).

On the other hand, the article is still relevant for what it purports to be relevant for: pertaining to U.S. miliatary plans (the U.S. military's plans) to stay in Afghanistan in peak numbers longer than Obama claimed they would. For this, an intensive persuasion effort is on, with General Petraeus speaking out (in cautious terms nevertheless) in the media. See here. The message I read out from this is "please let's not take that deadline so seriously." Previously, the military managed to get its way against the White House-weaved narrative of a D-Day coming up in Kandahar where Taliban central was supposed to be invaded. They played it down and kept it cool. Let's see where they get on this one. The stakes are higher this time.

A conceptualisation of state failure in a nutshell

Hello, this is Péter Marton speaking. Let me say a few words here about what on Earth I'm referring to in the title of this blog I launched in 2007. This is due here for the attention of those, too, who might have read the greater part of the literature on state failure. One should, after all, make it clear what one means by what one says.
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Reflecting the dual nature of the discourse, we can view states that are dysfunctional in one sense or another both with humanitarian and security concerns - in the most simple alternative terms: with concern for 'them' (the locals) and with concern for 'ourselves' ('over here'). That is the key to my conceptualisation. In e.g. Rotberg (2003, 2004) you'll find a mixed approach with security concerns voiced in the title of the volume of studies published in 2003 ('State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror'), and humanitarian concerns voiced in basically all the studies included in it.
***
I define state failure as a phenomenon with the analogy of 'market failures' in mind. Just like an instance of market failure doesn't constitute an overall failure of the market as an institution, state failure doesn't necessarily mean the end or full absence of the state.
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From a security point of view I conceptualise the state as 'a unit responsible for territorial control over a unit of world territory bounded by internationally recognised borders.' It is thus the failure of that unit when events or processes can take place within its boundaries that produce negative security consequences or 'negative spill-over effects' (NSEs) for the outside world (a neighbouring state or region or even all the states in the world, potentially). That may also be termed an 'IRG-failure,' the failure of the Internationally Recognised Government of the given state. It's a vital element that IRG-failure be contrary to the will of the IRG (which should be either unable to stop it from happening or be incapable of significantly hampering it). This way of defining state failure builds on the premise that security is globally interdependent - hence the definition of the 'chief function of the state' here is presented the way it is.
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From a humanitarian point of view, I regard the state as 'the means for the population of a unit of world territory, inhabiting the area bounded by internationally recognised borders, to provide stable life prospects for the long run'. The humanitarian definition of state failure will thus be quite broad - which may restrict its analytical usefulness. It will cover civil war-torn states, extremely poor states, as well as authoritarian regimes that use a lot of arbitrary violence. It will exclude states that provide stability in one way or another - using Michael Nicholson's terms, these can either be ruled by an authoritarian regime producing 'coercive stability' or governed by a democratic regime producing 'consensual stability'.

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Wednesday, August 25, 2010

Insurgent snipers in southern Afghanistan

WaPo v. geography

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