The wider region of Afghanistan

Everything connects to everything of course, but there are issues of indirect relevance to a topic that may deserve more attention than others. In Afghanistan's context, Indo-Pakistani relations are one such (highly complex) issue. Many have raised the suggestion by now that if only Pakistani calculations regarding India would be different, and in Islamabad (and Rawalpindi) the leadership would abandon quaint ideas of "strategic depth" and concerns over "strategic flanking" in Afghanistan, things could perhaps get better there.

One can perhaps be forgiven for going one step beyond this even, following the same thread: one might also assume that Indo-Pakistani relations might look somewhat different if there would be a different policy from Beijing towards Pakistan. And that policy, in turn, is determined partly by Chinese calculations regarding India.

Now, IR scholars might say there is a security dilemma between India and China. And this security dilemma proposition might occasionally be backed up by the argument of the Chinese sense of insecurity about a major part of their state territory, the relatively less densely populated "Xinjiang" and Tibet. Insecurity over these might make Chinese relations to neighbouring powers problematic in any case. But just how rational are such worries on the part of China today? Not being fully immersed in the subject, this strikes me as an interesting question, that Mayank Chhaya is raising in this article. Quote:

"If it is Beijing's unshakable conviction that Tibet was historically part of China, why is it that six decades after it incorporated the territory into the country it still feels compelled to seek India's reassurance? And why seek it from someone who has next to no role to play in the matter? A plausible answer is that at best it still remains uncertain about Tibet's cultural and emotional integration into China even though it has managed to complete its territorial integration.

It is hard to comprehend whether China harps on Tibet whenever it can because it does not want the world to forget that it owns it or because deep in its heart it still considers the incorporation tenuous. After all what difference India's position on Tibet can make in material terms for China when there is no prospect of it ever giving up a fourth of the Chinese territory that the ancient land represents? It is even more baffling considering India's frequently stated position that it considers Tibet to be an integral part of China."

Forgetting as a political factor

I have just bumped into this video. Just watch it first, and then I will comment on it below.

So the voice over the video says "there has not been a single internationally planned terrorist attack in Germany." The video is meant to carry an otherwise important message. We are no fans of Big Brother, right? But the argument that is supposed to make the case against BB stronger, that there has not been an internationally planned terrorist attack in Germany, is ignorant to absurdity. What would the creators of the clip need to be reminded of, from the 1972 Munich Olympics to the Sauerland cell? By the way, although the definition of "an internationally planned terrorist attack in Germany" it does not fit, but the Hamburg cell's role in the 9/11 attacks perhaps also deserves attention in this context.

I recently mocked a Foreign Policy Magazine editor's claim that the U.S. might easily just tolerate Hamed Karzai's killing by the Taliban, because "the American people's memories of 9/11 are fading." Here, in the above video, forgetting does seem to manifest in a direct, empirically verifiable way. The relevance of this is of course not at all restricted to Germany. But it does bring up memories in me of the times I spent as an exchange student, when I used to go to some ('light-ish') Middle Eastern Studies classes together with French and German students, and I still remember my own intellectually paralysed position in a debate in which they seriously pointed out to me that militants do not target France and Germany, only the U.S. and Israel, and those other states the policies of which they despise.

In Europe, who would forget which country attacked one's own in the past? But wars/incidents of violence amongst the people are just not the same thing. To a degree, that is stating the obvious, of course. I cannot quite explain this difference in clear-cut terms for now, but perhaps it was worth noting.

K-Paxtunkhwa...

Facebook's (and other randomly chosen websites' as well as, perhaps, the 21st century's) condemnation to a ban till the end of the month (and to damnation, presumably) by the judges of the Lahore High Court was preceded, as Fiza News noted, by protests in several places, including...

Yes, K-Pakhtunkhwa... That faraway, exotic place with its peculiar culture. Is it wrong if I am reminded of this movie clip? But I am reminded of it anyway, and this is only meant to be for some sarcastic fun, deliberately regardlessly of the actual peculiarities of Pashtun and other cultures in the region - and certainly not out of any lack of respect for the people living there:

That the NWFP's name was changed to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is no fresh news of course. I was merely surprised when, for this very first time, I saw its name simplified in the above way, for the purposes of better fitting it into an on-line newspaper column. But if you are interested in learning more about the re-naming, Zahid Shahab Ahmed nicely summarised the issues surrounding it here. Yours truly commented there as well.

Bagram, Kandahar, and DJ Khaled

I have just seen the NYT's report about the attack on the Bagram base. By the way, here is how a previous, though smaller-scale, attack ended, in March 2009, really not for the faint of heart. The one thing I am struck by is the last sentence of the NYT article: "The back-to-back attacks came as American and Afghan leaders were preparing to launch a major offensive in the city of Kandahar to break the hold of the insurgents in southern Afghanistan."

What is that supposed to add? That this is why the insurgents attacked in Bagram? The answer is no. They attacked because spectacular, complex attacks such as this one draw attention and influence the bigger picture in the information war over perceptions. Or is it supposed to say that the U.S. and ISAF are going to fight back? Probably that is not why this sentence was added but let me address that possibility anyway.

Talking of an offensive in Kandahar is silly. And to my best knowledge the plan now is something consisting certainly not only of military operations but a series of measures in various domains (including governance), involving certainly not only military actors. And there is talk of how this all will be Afghan-led. Moreover, some are talking about a postponement of whatever it is that is coming to autumn. And what is actually happening from the part of insurgents with something potentially coming in Kandahar in mind is a stepped-up campaign of assassinations. There, in Kandahar. That is what one reads out of reports these days.

So I am interested to see if this sort of schizophrenic media coverage comes because there is still so much uncertainty (and likely turf battles and conflicting visions) in the background regarding what exactly ought to be done?

Meanwhile, I have by chance listened into Palestinian-American DJ Khaled's new hit, "We takin' over," and I was struck by how some of the lyrics reflect conventional POP-COIN (population-centric counterinsurgency) wisdom. In a twisted way of course:

"If you want to, we can supply you,
Got enough work to feed the whole town,
They won't shoot you, unless you try to,
Come around and try to stomp on our ground,
'Cause we takin' over, one city at a time..."

Put this in the context of possibly upcoming moves in Kandahar for some deeply intellectual fun.

Afghanistan, the global struggle

Rick Rozoff's piece is worth a read: a good overview of how many are involved in Afghanistan these days. One sentence struck me as somewhat oddly formulated towards the end:

"Afghanistan has, whether by convenience, design or some combination of the two, been transformed into a vast training ground for the consolidation of a fifty-nation military structure that has already been extended into Central Asia, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East."

Was there a design behind this? To a degree, yes, of course, but it is not as though the whole Afghanistan campaign would have been started to that end, so that sort of message certainly should not be implied here. Rozoff himself means more the sort of opportunity for joint/mixed ops experimenting that arose with this campaign. In that sense, there is a design. Afghanistan has indeed turned into a global governance exercise.
The one question that still bothers me is what sort of use it has if it fails? And as to the military aspect of this: will we see that extensive benefits of supposedly increased interoperability? Certainly not against space aliens. But I do see how this can be useful in some ways in crisis zones, perhaps in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, elsewhere, later on. Anyways, this may be a question worth pondering in more detail.

A piece of history retold by Khalid Khawaja

Wow, this is an interesting interview. The late* Khalid Khawaja just does not fit many stereotypes and that makes this interview with him very interesting reading, from 2005. Having been kicked out from ISI for complaining about Zia ul-Haq's loyalty to Islam (!), and having fought with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, someone who thinks Indian Muslims have more rights than Pakistani Muslims and that suicide bombings killing innocents should be haram. And yet someone who thinks fondly of Osama bin Laden. How could this be? That is what you might be asking. Part of the explanation is just a totally different perspective on the world, of course. That is not something one can convey with a blogpost if one is not sharing that perspective of his. Another part of the explanation, the one I can try to convey is the rather different Osama he got to know, a long time ago, when bin Laden was still busy organising his al-qaeda as-sulbah, and not really involved in organising transnational terrorist attacks (the first of which only came at the end of 1992, in Yemen, and even at that time as one targeted against U.S. military personnel; just failing to hit its target). Abdullah Azzam was still alive. Two key excerpts are included below, as provided in the interview that was prepared by Syed Saleem Shahzad, the journalist who always delivers something new.

So Khalid Khawaja tells part of his story below, naming some key names...

"The story starts in 1986-87, when out of emotion I wrote a letter to General Zia ul-Haq saying that he was a hypocrite and he was only interested in ruling Pakistan, rather than imposing Islamic law in the country. General Zia immediately ordered my dismissal from my basic services in the Pakistan air force, where I was a squadron leader, and from the ISI, where I was deputed at the Afghan desk. I went to Afghanistan and fought side-by-side with the Afghan mujahideen against Soviet troops. There I developed a friendship with Dr Abdullah Azzam [a mentor of bin Laden], Osama bin Laden and Sheikh Abdul Majeed Zindani [another mentor of bin Laden's]. At the same time, I was still in touch with my former organization, the ISI, and its then DG [director general], retired Lieutenant General Hamid Gul."

He goes on to describe how "his and Hamid Gul's" Islamic Democratic Alliance did not work to defeat the PPP at upcoming elections in 1988. Nawaz Sharif then purportedly asked Khawaja to arrange a meeting with the ever generous Arab sheikh, Osama bin Laden. The aim was to get money, in order to challenge the PPP more effectively.

"The most historic was the meeting in the Green Palace Hotel in Medina between Nawaz Sharif, Osama and myself. Osama asked Nawaz to devote himself to "jihad in Kashmir". Nawaz immediately said, "I love jihad." Osama smiled, and then stood up from his chair and went to a nearby pillar and said. "Yes, you may love jihad, but your love for jihad is this much." He then pointed to a small portion of the pillar. "Your love for children is this much," he said, pointing to a larger portion of the pillar. "And your love for your parents is this much," he continued, pointing towards the largest portion. "I agree that you love jihad, but this love is the smallest in proportion to your other affections in life." These sorts of arguments were beyond Nawaz Sharif's comprehension and he kept asking me. "Manya key nai manya?" [Agreed or not?] He was looking for a Rs500 million [US$8.4 million at today's rate] grant from Osama."

Finally, Khawaja mentions how after this other politicians also wanted a slice of the pie, and asked for meetings with "the Sheikh."

* Showing just how busy I was in the latter weeks, I was not aware of Khalid Khawaja's recent death when I posted these comments about his interview.

Vetting jihadi recruits...

Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau present here a brief discussion in Newsweek of how "vetting" is done in the case of jihadi organisations. It is quite an interesting angle to look at jihadi organisations from. It shows how for these organisations willing recruits may be just as problematic as a walk-in asset for an intelligence agency. "O, hai, thx for coming, bai!" may be an instinctive answer to someone coming with no acquaintant already inside. But obviously there is a temptation as well to accept the services of someone who is basically trying to follow, in their interpretation, the righteous path. This is all pretty obvious, and the discussion remains on the level of the obvious in the piece I linked to above.

If you want to read something going much more below the surface, here is Omar Nasiri's book (the cover) below: "Inside the jihad." It tells you a lot. An awful lot and even more. I know it is not new, but I have two good reasons to recommend it now: one is that I became aware of it only recently and I found it to be a really precious source of information (besides being an interesting story); the other is something you may appreciate more, namely that the CIA's Khost incident, at the end of 2009, in which a turned al-Qaida double agent of Jordanian origin blew himself up killing and injuring a lot of agents, could be seen in a different light when you look at the sort of operations Nasiri was involved in, and how he was handled by the services that worked with him.

And an update (May 12): it seems like Eric Breininger went through similar training as Omar Nasiri even as late as 2007/2008. (To specify: Nasiri visited the Khaldan camp for basic training back in the mid-1990s and went on to spend time at Darunta.)

Direct fire attacks: March 2009 - March 2010

Look at the orange sections of the graph columns for March 2009 and March 2010, respectively. (Source: this recent DoD report.) Direct fire attacks' trend is on the rise, still. The Taliban version of "Max Leverage"? More troops equal more contact? Discuss.